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Integrating attentional control
theory and the strength model
of self-control
Chris Englert* and Alex Bertrams
Department of Educational Psychology, Institute of Educational Science, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
In the present article, we argue that it may be fruitful to incorporate the ideas of
the strength model of self-control into the core assumptions of the well-established
attentional control theory (ACT). In ACT, it is assumed that anxiety automatically leads to
attention disruption and increased distractibility, which may impair subsequent cognitive
or perceptual-motor performance, but only if individuals do not have the ability to
counteract this attention disruption. However, ACT does not clarify which process
determines whether one can volitionally regulate attention despite experiencing high
levels of anxiety. In terms of the strength model of self-control, attention regulation can
be viewed as a self-control act depending on the momentary availability of self-control
strength. We review literature that has revealed that self-control strength moderates the
anxiety–performance relationship, discuss how to integrate these two theoretical models,
and offer practical recommendations of how to counteract negative anxiety effects.
Keywords: attentional control theory, anxiety, ego depletion, self-control, strength model of self-control
Integrating Attentional Control Theory and the Strength Model
of Self-Control
Performing under high-pressure conditions along with the accompanying sensations of anxiety can
impair academic (e.g., Zeidner, 1998; Ashcraft and Krause, 2007; Beilock, 2008) and perceptual-
motor performance (e.g., Behan andWilson, 2008; Nibbeling et al., 2012). One of themost influential
theoretical frameworks that attempts to explain this finding is the attentional control theory (ACT;
Eysenck et al., 2007).
The experience of anxiety often leads to rumination and worrisome thoughts regarding whether
one can master a given situation or not, and what the potential consequences of failure may be
(e.g., Eysenck, 1992). Worries preoccupy working memory capacity, reducing the accessibility of
attentional resources used for storing and processing relevant information in the central executive
(i.e., cognitive interference; e.g., Eysenck et al., 2005; for an overview on Baddeley’s model of working
memory, see Baddeley, 1986, 2001). This load onworkingmemory capacity can potentially influence
performance during concurrent tasks for which efficient attention regulation is required (e.g.,
Ashcraft and Krause, 2007). Eysenck et al. (2007) proposed that anxiety and accompanying worries
hinder efficient attention regulation by disrupting the balance between the top-down attentional
system (which enables goal-oriented information processing) and the bottom-up attentional system
(which allows for broader, stimulus-driven information processing; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002),
leading to a dominance of the bottom-up stimulus-driven attentional system. However, top-down
attentional control is necessary for superior performance in cognitively demanding tasks (e.g.,
complex mathematical operations; Ashcraft and Krause, 2007) and in fine perceptual-motor tasks
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(e.g., dart throwing; Nibbeling et al., 2012) because individuals
need to inhibit their impulses (e.g., paying attention to task-
irrelevant stimuli) and instead shift their focus onto the
task at hand (for a broader discussion on the executive
functions inhibition and shifting, see Miyake et al., 2000)1. The
dominance of the bottom-up attentional system hampers the
ability to focus on relevant stimuli (e.g., Carver and Scheier,
1981). This assumption is supported by studies in which
visual attention, which is viewed as a reliable indicator of
attentional control (Henderson, 2003), was negatively affected
by increased anxiety levels (e.g., Behan and Wilson, 2008).
To conclude, anxiety makes it harder to regulate attention
volitionally.
Eysenck et al. (2007) have argued that anxious individuals are
generally able to counteract the automatic tendency to process
information in a bottom-upmanner by investing additional effort
(see also Nieuwenhuys and Oudejans, 2012). This claim has
received support from studies in which there was no negative
relationship between anxiety and performance (in academic
settings: e.g., Seipp, 1991; in sports settings: e.g., Woodman and
Hardy, 2003). However, ACT is not accurate in naming the
actual processes that determine if anxiety impairs subsequent
performance or not. Still, Eysenck et al. (2007) have argued
that “[i]f auxiliary processing resources are available, impaired
performance effectiveness is less likely to occur (: : :). If these
resources are unavailable, then performance effectiveness will be
impaired” (Eysenck et al., 2007, p. 337). This statement indicates
that the ability to minimize the adverse anxiety effects seems to
depend on the availability of some additional resource yet to be
defined. In the present paper, we argue that the ability to exert
self-control is the missing link in ACT (e.g., Baumeister et al.,
1998).
The Strength Model of Self-Control
In terms of the strength model by Baumeister et al. (1998), self-
control is defined as a process in which predominant impulses can
be volitionally overridden to achieve a specific goal, meaning the
ability to resist immediate gratification in view of a more desirable
outcome. Baumeister and colleagues have proposed that all acts
of self-control—for instance, persistence (e.g., Baumeister et al.,
1998), attention regulation (e.g., Schmeichel and Baumeister,
2010), or emotion regulation (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2000)—are
based on one global metaphorical resource comparable to a
muscle. But the capacity of this resource is limited, which means
that one’s resource can become depleted after a primary act of self-
control, and is not immediately replenished (ego depletion; e.g.,
Baumeister et al., 1998). In a state of ego depletion, decrements in
self-control performance aremore likely to occur.Most important
for the present work is the finding that the ability to inhibit
responses and to flexibly shift attention are also self-control acts
1Apart from inhibition and shifting, Miyake et al. (2000) also identified
updating as a third executive function of working memory. However, Eysenck
et al. (2007) have argued that updating is an executive function which
supposedly is not significantly affected by anxiety. Therefore, we have not
focused on updating in this paper.
that depend on themomentary availability of self-control strength
(e.g., Ilkowska and Engle, 2010; Robinson et al., 2010; Hofmann
et al., 2012). There are many studies that have supported this
general finding, which is reflected in the findings of a recentmeta-
analysis that included 83 studies on ego depletion (Hagger et al.,
2010; see Carter andMcCullough, 2013, 2014, for criticism of this
meta-analysis; see Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2014, for a reply to
the criticism).
Integrating ACT and the Strength Model of
Self-Control
According to Hagger (2009), theoretical integrations in general
are beneficial for several reasons, including that they can fill
theoretical gaps. Conforming to this notion, we aim to integrate
the strength model of self-control into ACT. Such an endeavor
is in line with very recent considerations of Hagger (2015)
about the integration of the strength model into Hobfoll’s (1989)
conservation of resources theory on coping with stress.
As stated above, increased levels of anxiety are associated with
a tendency to worry about one’s performance (e.g., Eysenck,
1992). This may be problematic in tasks requiring top-down,
goal-oriented information processing, highlighted by studies
which have shown a negative anxiety–performance relationship
(e.g., Ashcraft and Krause, 2007; Behan and Wilson, 2008;
Beilock, 2008). As proposed in ACT, one can counteract this
automatic tendency by investing additional effort or by activating
additional resources (Eysenck et al., 2007; Nieuwenhuys and
Oudejans, 2012). Speaking in terms of the strength model of
self-control, counteracting predominant impulses—in this case,
the automatic activation of bottom-up information processing
under high levels of anxiety—is an ability that is dependent on
self-control strength (e.g., Schmeichel and Baumeister, 2010).
Therefore, we assume that self-control strength moderates
the anxiety–performance relationship in tasks requiring goal-
oriented attention regulation: In a state of ego depletion, an
individual should display worse performance under high levels of
anxiety because one cannot invest additional self-control strength
to counteract the automatic tendency to process information
in a bottom-up manner. When an individual has sufficient
levels of self-control strength, we do not expect a negative
anxiety–performance relationship because self-control strength
may be serving as a shield against the negative anxiety effects
on attention regulation. In the following, we report studies from
the field of sport psychology (Englert and Bertrams, 2012, 2013;
Englert et al., 2015a,b) and educational psychology (Bertrams
et al., 2013; Bertrams and Englert, 2014) that support this
claim.
ACT and the Strength Model of
Self-Control: Findings From Sport
Psychology
For successful performance in fine perceptual-motor tasks
(e.g., dart throwing), efficient attention regulation is needed
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(Abernethy et al., 2007): Irrelevant stimuli (e.g., the crowd)
need to be blocked out, and instead, focus has to be shifted
onto a relevant target (e.g., bull’s eye in darts; Nibbeling
et al., 2012). However, increased levels of anxiety reduce the
ability of athletes to concentrate on the respective targets; for
instance, anxious individuals had shorter and fewer fixations
on the bull’s eye in a dart-throwing task under anxiety (e.g.,
Nibbeling et al., 2012). In a series of studies, Englert and
Bertrams (2012, 2013) were able to demonstrate that self-control
strength moderates the anxiety–performance relationship in
fine perceptual-motor tasks that depend on efficient attention
regulation. Anxious participants in a state of ego depletion hit
fewer basketball free-throws, scored lower in a dart-throwing
task, and performed worse in a dexterity task compared
to anxious participants with temporarily available self-control
strength.
The assumption that ego depletion hinders efficient attention
regulation in fine perceptual-motor tasks has received further
empirical support from two recent studies. In the first study,
participants performed a dart-throwing task in a high or low
anxiety condition while wearing eye-tracking devices (Englert
et al., 2015b). As previously mentioned, gaze behavior can be
viewed as an indicator of attention regulation (e.g., Henderson,
2003; Vine and Wilson, 2011). Again, ego depletion moderated
the anxiety–performance relationship because anxiety was only
associated with performance impairments in the depletion
condition. Additionally, depleted participants in the high-
anxiety condition also showed less efficient gaze behavior
because they displayed fewer and shorter fixations on the
bull’s eye compared to non-depleted participants. Apparently,
ego depletion hindered efficient attention regulation in anxious
individuals.
In the second study, attention regulation in anxious individuals
was also negatively affected by ego depletion (Englert et al.,
2015a). Participants performed a basketball free-throw task under
high-anxiety conditions while momentarily available self-control
strength was experimentally manipulated. Additionally, they were
listening to an external audio stream via stereo headphones
representing worrisome thoughts often experienced in stressful
situations (Oudejans et al., 2011). Again, anxiety was only
associated with performance decrements in depleted participants.
Interestingly, depleted participants also paid more attention to
the distracting external audio stream compared to participants
with temporarily available self-control strength. So, apparently,
self-control strength protects attention regulation from increased
distractibility under high levels of anxiety.
The aforementioned studies indicate that self-control strength
moderates the anxiety–performance relationship in fine
perceptual-motor tasks. In line with ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007),
anxiety impaired attention regulation as increased distractibility
was indicated by less efficient gaze behavior (Englert et al., 2015b)
and by the tendency to pay more attention to irrelevant stimuli in
anxious individuals (Englert et al., 2015a). Furthermore, as stated
in ACT, individuals are generally capable of counteracting the
negative anxiety effects on attention regulation. The presented
studies show that individuals are only able to counteract the
negative anxiety effects when they have sufficient self-control
strength. If self-control strength is temporarily depleted,
participants seem to be more prone to be distracted, leaving less
attention available for the present task.
ACT and the Strength Model
of Self-Control: Findings From Educational
Psychology
Plenty of research has demonstrated that anxiety can negatively
affect cognitive performance (e.g., complex mathematical
operations) and can thus be a negative predictor of one’s
academic career (e.g., Zeidner, 1998). To perform the required
cognitive operations in a cognitive task, workingmemory capacity
is required (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2005). In a state of anxiety, though,
internal factors (e.g., anxiety-related performance worries) or
external factors (e.g., noise in the classroom) can consume
parts of the limited resources of working memory, making
it harder to adequately perform these cognitive operations
(e.g., Deffenbacher, 1978). Nonetheless, there are also studies
which do not report a negative statistical relationship between
anxiety and cognitive performance (e.g., Seipp, 1991), leaving
the question of which potential moderators could come into
play. ACT has also been adopted to explain this inconsistent
pattern of results: Just as in the case of sports performance,
it is necessary to block out distracting stimuli to successfully
finish a cognitive task. The inhibition function and the ability
to shift attentional focus onto the immediate cognitive task can
be impaired by heightened anxiety levels (e.g., Eysenck et al.,
2007).
As previously mentioned, the ability to inhibit responses and
to flexibly shift attention are self-control acts that depend on
self-control strength (Ilkowska and Engle, 2010; Robinson et al.,
2010; Hofmann et al., 2012). Consequently, there should be
a stronger negative effect of anxiety on cognitive performance
in individuals with depleted self-control strength compared to
participants with available self-control strength. This hypothesis
has received empirical support in two recently published papers.
Bertrams and Englert (2014) reported that there was no main
effect of anxiety on knowledge retrieval in their study. However,
there was a significant interaction between anxiety and self-
control strength that revealed that there was only a negative
effect of anxiety on knowledge retrieval in depleted participants.
The authors concluded that depleted participants were not able
to compensate for the negative anxiety effects on attention
regulation. In the same vein, Bertrams et al. (2013) found a
negative relationship between anxiety and performance in tests on
verbal learning (Study 1) and in mental arithmetic tasks (Study 2)
in ego depleted participants, whereas there was no significant
relationship between anxiety and performance in participants
with available self-control strength.
To summarize, in the reported studies, participants only
suffered from anxiety in a state of ego depletion. Available self-
control strength served as a buffer against the negative anxiety
effects on cognitive performance. Boosting self-control strength
may thus help anxious individuals to show their best possible
performance in academic testing situations.
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Concluding Remarks and Potential
Implications
In ACT it is assumed that anxiety leads to a dominance of
the bottom-up stimulus-driven attentional system, which makes
individuals more distractible, potentially impairing subsequent
performance in tasks requiring selective attention (Eysenck et al.,
2007). However, by initiating self-regulatory processes, anxiety-
based effects on attention regulation can be compensated, but
thus far, it had not been clear which self-regulatory processes
are actually at work and why it is not always possible to
compensate for the anxiety effects on attention regulation
and performance. By integrating the strength model of self-
control (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998), we can now determine
under which circumstances anxiety can potentially impair
performance and under which conditions anxious individuals
should be able to perform to their highest capabilities, thereby
explaining the inconsistent findings on the anxiety–performance
relationship (e.g., Seipp, 1991; Woodman and Hardy, 2003).
Under ego depletion, individuals suffer from increased anxiety
levels because they do not have the resources to offset the
automatic tendency to process information in a bottom-up
manner. If self-control strength is intact, efficient attention
regulation and performance can be obtained (e.g., Englert and
Bertrams, 2012, 2013; Bertrams et al., 2013; Englert et al.,
2015a,b).
We also reviewed studies that focused on the assumed
process—increased distractibility—which is responsible for
performance decrements under high-anxiety levels and is mostly
affected by ego depletion. According to ACT (Eysenck et al.,
2007), anxiety leads to increased distractibility, making it harder
to focus on the given task. Anxious participants with temporarily
available self-control strength were not only able to keep their
performance levels consistent, but were also more adept in
regulating their attention because they displayed more efficient
gaze behavior (Englert et al., 2015b) and paid less attention to
irrelevant, distracting stimuli compared to anxious participants
with depleted self-control strength (Englert et al., 2015a).
Recently, Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) argued that the ego
depletion effect would be better explained by temporary
motivational and attentional shifts toward reward and
gratification. Moreover, Kurzban et al. (2013) suggested as
an alternative explanation to the assumption of limited self-
control strength that people disengage from self-control when
they had experienced high costs relative to the benefits of
exerting self-control in an initial task. These alternative accounts
are, however, incompatible with the empirical data we reported
in the present work: By reducing their self-control during test
situations, anxious people do obviously nothing that would help
them to achieve some sort of reward. Rather, they boost the
likelihood of failure, and the experience of even higher costs. In
contrast, the notion of a limited self-control capacity is well in
line with the abovementioned findings.
We would also like to mention some ideas on how to
prevent anxiety-related performance impairments. Self-control
strength is often compared to a human muscle: Like a muscle,
one’s self-control strength can become exhausted and depleted,
impairing subsequent performance (e.g., Baumeister et al.,
1998). Also like a muscle, one’s self-control strength can be
trained, enabling better self-control performance over time (for
an overview, see also Baumeister et al., 2006). For instance,
participants that regularly exerted self-control over a 2-week
period outperformed participants that did not receive self-
control training (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2004; Muraven, 2010).
Interestingly, there has been no study, to our knowledge, that
has tested whether regular self-control training help anxious
individuals to improve their performance under high-pressure
situations. Therefore, future studies should try to transfer these
laboratory-based findings to more applied contexts. In line with
the muscle metaphor, there are also strategies which may lead
to a quicker replenishment of self-control strength, as Tyler
and Burns (2008) have demonstrated that active relaxation is a
useful strategy in that regard. Transferring self-control training
to applied settings with the aim of reducing the potential
negative anxiety effects on performancemight not be too difficult,
or, in some cases, a transfer might even have taken place
already. For instance, sport psychologists highly recommend the
use of active relaxation techniques before and during sporting
competitions (e.g., Williams, 2006). Also, in the classroom,
relaxation techniques have been applied before important exams
(e.g., Zeidner, 1998).
The above reviewed studies make a strong case for integrating
the assumptions of the strength model of self-control (e.g.,
Baumeister et al., 1998) into ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007). Such an
integration makes up for a major shortcoming of ACT because,
thus far, it had not been clear which self-regulatory processes
determine whether or not anxious individuals can counteract
detrimental anxiety effects. By investing self-control strength,
performance can be maintained despite high-anxiety levels.
Based on the present thoughts, it may also be possible to further
integrate ACT into a broader theoretical context in future work.
According to the default-interventionism framework of the dual-
process theories (Morewedge and Kahneman, 2010; Evans and
Stanovich, 2013), the so-called System 1 reacts to given situations
by generating automatic default response tendencies. System 2
would intervene with controlled operations when these default
responses run into difficulties. However, as Bertrams et al. (2015)
recently argued, intervention of System 2 may fail when self-
control strength is currently low. Relating this approach to ACT,
this means that anxiety would cause automatic responses that
could harm performance by default (i.e., bottom-up processing
that causes a decline of attention from the task at hand). When
self-control strength is available, however, one could intervene by
controlled attention regulation.
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